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INTRODUCTION 
Tolman's (1938) explanation of the rat's maze behavior in 
terms of expectancy of goal attainment and demand for goal is 
one of the few conceptual schemes developed in the animal labo- 
ratory that has found application in the study of human be- 
havior. In the process of this application, "expectancy of goal 
attainment" was termed expectancy and "demand for goal" was 
called reinforcement value. In recent years there has been con- 
siderable research concerning the relationship that may or may 
not exist between these two variables and their role in deter- 
mining behavior. Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, and Sears (1944) 
studied this relationship and its effects on level of aspi- 
ration and general decision-making. Edwards (1955) used them in 
the context of economic decisions. And, most recently, Atkinson 
(1957) and Rotter (1954) have used expectancy and reinforcement 
value concepts in the study of achievement-oriented behavior and 
social learning, respectively. 
The present study represents an attempt to further clarify 
the relationship between expectancy and reinforcement value. 
The framework for this investigation was provided by Rotter's 
(1954) social learning theory. One of the basic assumptions of 
this theory is that behavior potential is a function of expec- 
tancy and reinforcement value. Expectancy is defined as "...the 
probability held by the individual that a particular reinforce- 
ment will occur as a function of a specific behavior on his part 
in a specific situation or situations" (Rotter, 1954, p. 107). 
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"The reinforcement value of any external reinforcement may be 
ideally defined as the degree of preference for any reinforce- 
ment to occur if the possibilities of their occurring were all 
equal" (Rotter, 1954,'p. 107). Basically, Rotter assumes that 
expectancy and reinforcement value are independent, although he 
states that under certain specific conditions a relationship be- 
tween them may develop based on the learning history of the in- 
dividual. Empirical support for the assumption of independence 
was found by Edwards (1955) in his study of economic decisions. 
On the other hand, studies of decision-making under conditions 
of uncertainty have led Atkinson (1957) and Feather (1959) to the 
conclusion that expectancy and reinforcement value are inter- 
related. 
A possible clarification of these differences was offered 
by Worell (1956). He makes a distinction between achievement and 
non-achievement situations. In the achievement situation, per- 
formance is seen by the subject as being dependent upon his skill 
and thus there is an implicit challenge to his competency. There- 
fore, expectancy statements may remain unchanged or even be 
lowered in a defensive fashion so as to mitigate any potential 
negative reinforcement. In non-achievement situations no such 
challenge is offered to the S's competency, and the element of 
wishfulness may even come to play a prominent role. This might be 
exemplified by so-called chance situations. 
Worell's explanation is supported by Phares' (1965) review 
of the literature which suggests that many of the studies indi- 
cating an increase in expectancy with an increase in the value of 
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the goal used experimental situations involving gambling-luck 
factors, while studies showing no increase in expectancy with an 
increase in the value of the goal tended to use experimental 
situations involving skill or achievement factors. It is con- 
ceivable, then, that the view stressing the independenoe of ex- 
pectancy and reinforcement value is as correct as the view which 
stresses their relationship. If this is the case, the basic 
problem is one of identifying the situational variables that might 
affect the degree of the relationship, rather than attempting to 
show in any definitive fashion whether or not there is a relation- 
ship. 
The skill-chance dichotomy is one such situational variable 
studied by Phares (1965). Using Worell's argument, he reasoned 
that following a success experience, the introduction of reward 
in a skill situation should produce a decrement in expectancy, 
while in a non-reward situation an increment in expectancy should 
occur. In a chance situation, however, he predicted that there 
would be no difference in expectancy changes between reward and 
non-reward conditions following the introduction of reward. The 
,former prediction was supported; however, the latter was not. 
Since similar changes occurred in both the skill and chance 
situations, Phares hypothesized, post hoc, that, although expec- 
tancy was consistently higher in the skill condition than in the 
chance situation, Ss tended to perceive the chance situation as 
partially controlled by skill factors. Phares' use of a modified 
form of the Stromberg Dexterity Test (1947) could have been re- 
sponsible for the failure of Ss to perceive the chance situation 
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as primarily controlled by chance factors. The object of the 
task was to replace small, colored blocks into the correspon- 
dingly colored sections of a board as quickly as possible. It 
would seem that this was inherently a skill situation. Thus,it is 
probable that the use of instructional set to manipulate the 
nature of the task as either skill or chance was not effective 
for the chance groups in this situation. 
Another concept from Rotter's social learning theory that 
may be relevant to the identification of variables that influence 
the relationship between expectancy and reinforcement value is 
the internal-external (I-E) personality dimension (Rotter, 1966). 
Specifically, the I-E dimension refers to the degree to which the 
individual perceives reinforcements to be contingent upon his own 
behavior versus the degree to which he feels that the occurrences 
of rewards are due to forces outside himself, and consequently 
are independent of his own actions. In short, I-E is considered 
to be a general personality factor that cuts across need areas 
such as independence, love and affection, recognition-status, 
protection-dependency, and physical comfort. 
The first attempt to objectively measure individual dif- 
ferences in a generalized expectancy for either internal or ex- 
ternal control was made by Phares (1957). Since then, the scale 
has evolved into a 29-item forced-choice test with 23 I-E items 
and 6 filler items (Rotter, 1966). A sample item is as follows 
(see Appendix A for the entire scale): 
a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to 
do with luck. 
b. Many times we might as well decide what to do by flip- 
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ping a coin. 
S's score on this test is simply the total number of "internal 
choices" made by the individual. The typical mean for a col- 
lege population is apprdximately 14.5 with a median of about 
15.0 (Rotter, 1966). 
Early investigations with the I-E scale have shown that in-. 
ternally controlled individuals are more likely to take social 
action to better their conditions (Gore and Rotter, 1963), are 
more likely to learn and remember information relevant to their 
future goals (Seeman, 1963; Seeman and Evans, 1962), and are 
more concerned with their ability, particularly with their 
failures (Efran, 1964). 
More recently, Rotter and Mulry (1965) studied the poten- 
tial differences in the value or importance placed upon different 
kinds of reinforcements by individuals who could be characterized 
as either internal or external in their generalized expectancy. 
Rotter and Mulry used an angle-matching task with two instruc- 
tional sets which served to structure the nature'of the task as 
either skill or chance. Using reaction time as the dependent 
variable, Rotter and Mulry predicted that internally controlled 
Ss would take longer to make a discrimination in a skill as op- 
posed to a chance situation since internals would place a higher 
value on the achievement of reward in a skill situation. Corres- 
pondingly, they predicted that the external individual would show 
longer decision times in the chance situation since he would be 
primarily concerned with whether or not he was a lucky or an un- 
lucky person. Both of these predictions were confirmed. The data 
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also indicated that the overall mean decision time in the skill 
situation was higher than the mean decision time in the chance 
situation. Inasmuch as expectancy was controlled in this study, 
it would seem that individuals who can be characterized as either 
internals or externals do show differences in the value or im- 
portance they place on different kinds of reinforcements. Of 
,course, this assumes the validity of decision time as a measure 
of reinforcement value. 
The present study was designed to include the I-E dimension 
in a partial replication of Phares' (1965) study concerning the 
effect of reward introduction and the resulting changes in ex- 
pectancy in both skill and chance situations. Two other changes 
were also made. First, an ambiguous situation, i.e. a situation 
unstructured in the sense that specific skill-chance instructions 
were not given to Ss, was added to permit a more precise analysis 
across a continuum of situations. Second, a task requiring fe- 
male Ss to predict a child's responses to a children's person- 
ality test was used as a more novel task., The novelty of the 
task served two potential functions: first, it was hoped that it 
would avoid the inherent skill nature of the Stromberg Dexterity 
Test; second, since internal and external control are presumed 
to be generalized expectancies relatively nonspecific to any 
given situation, the novelty of the task might also reduce the 
likelihood that any expectancies specific to the situation 
through prior experience would contaminate the more general ex- 
pectancy for either internal or external control. In addition, 
two reward trials were used instead of one in order to allow a 
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more extensive analysis of expectancy changes. 
Since Rotter and Mulry (1965) found that decision time was 
not influenced by expectancy for success, and previous research 
by Barker (1946) and Lotsof (1956) indicated that decision time 
increased with the importance of the reinforcement when expec- 
tancy was held constant, it was concluded that expectancy and 
decision time were independent measures. Therefore, in the cur- 
rent study both expectancy and reinforcement value (as measured 
by decision time) were studied as they relate to: 1) the I-E 
dimension, 2) skill, chance, and ambiguous situations, and 3) the 
introduction of extrinsic reward. 
The specific predictions, based on the previous studies and 
analyses were as follows: 
I. Following success in a skill situation, introduction of 
reward will result in a decrement in expectancy for success, 
while in a non-reward skill situation there will be a corres- 
ponding increment. In reward and non-reward chance situations, 
however, there will 'be no differences in ,expectancy statements; 
that is, little change will occur in either the reward or non- 
reward conditions. This prediction follows directly from 
Worell's (1956) suggestion that skill or achievement situations 
present a challenge to S's compet.ency and may result in lowered 
expectancies in order to mitigate the possibility of failure. 
Conversely, the chance or non-achievement situation offers no 
such challenge to S's competency and therefore the introduction 
of reward should not result in a lowered expectancy. Therefore, 
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it is predicted that for the two trials in which the reward - 
non-reward condition is introduced, the expectancy statements 
will show an interaction between the situation and reward - non- 
reward. 
II. Following introduction of reward in a skill situation, 
there will be an increment in decision time as compared to a non- 
reward skill situation. A similar outcome will follow in com- 
parable chance situations. However, differences in decision time 
between reward and non-reward conditions will be greater under 
skill conditions than under chance conditions. This predicted 
interaction is based on the assumption that the attainment of an 
extrinsic reward in a skill situation is more valued than a com- 
parable reward received in a chance situation because it is 
linked to intrinsic rewards such as achievement, competence, etc. 
Thus it is predicted that the analysis of the decision time data 
will show a situation X reward - non-reward interaction. 
III. a. Since internals value the demonstration of 
skill, they should show longer decision times in the skill 
situation than in the chance situation prior to the introduction 
of reward. Likewise, internals should feel that expectancies for 
future reinforcement can be based on past experience in skill 
situations but riot in chance situations. Thus, they should also 
show higher expectancies for success (in a positively rein- 
forced trial sequence) in a skill situation than in a chance 
situation prior to the introduction of reward. 
b. Since externals tend to be concerned with whether 
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or not they are lucky persons, comparable outcomes are expected 
for externally controlled individuals in chance situations prior 
to the introduction of reward. That is, positive reinforcement 
in a chance situation should tend to reinforce the external's 
view that he is indeed lucky and thus his expectancies should 
rise accordingly following positive reinforcement. However, in 
a skill situation positive reinforcement should have a lesser 
effect on expectancies. Finally, decision times should be 
greater for externals in the chance situation since they pre- 
sumably place more value on the occurrence of chance rewards. 
If the reasoning of both parts of this prediction is cor- 
rect, a situation X internal-external control interaction in the 
expectancy and decision time data should be seen for the trials 
prior to the introduction of reward. 
IV. The specific reaction time and expectancy predictions 
following the introduction of reward for the internal and ex- 
ternal groups are summarized in Table I, relative to the ap- 
propriate non-reward controls. The decision time predictions 
stem directly from the findings of Rotter and Mulry. Although 
Rotter and Mulry did not include an ambiguous situation, it is 
assumed that Ss will, in the absence of explicit cues to the 
contrary, structure ambiguous situations in the light of their 
generalized expectancies for internal-external control. Thus, 
internals will structure the ambiguous situation as an internally 
controlled or skill situation, while externals will impose an 
externally controlled or chance structure. 
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The expectancy predictions are based on an elaboration of 
Worell's (1956) explanation of expectancy statements in skill 
situations. Briefly, internals are expected to have lower ex- 
pectancies than externals following the introduction of reward 
in the skill situation because of their skill oriented generalized 
expectancy. This generalized expectancy toward skill should 
make them more defensive than externals who have a chance 
oriented generalized expectancy and who thus will not be subject 
to the same defensive reactions. The same reasoning applied to 
the chance situation leads to the prediction that externals will 
be more defensive than internals since externally oriented in- 
dividuals are primarily concerned with whether or not they are 
lucky. In short, both internal and external Ss will react de- 
fensively and thus lower their expectancies when they attach a 
high value to a situation where failure would lead to possible 
strong negative reinforcement. On the basis of this reasoning 
both the expectancy and decision time data should show a second 
order interaction between the situation, the reward - non- 
reward condition, and internal-external control for the two 
trials in which the reward - non-reward condition is introduced. 
Table I 
I-E Predictions Following Introduction of Reward in 
Skill, Chance and Ambiguous Situations 
INTERNALS EXTERNALS 
Skill Chance Ambiguous Skill Chance Ambiguous 
No Same as No Same as 
Expectancy Decrement change skill change Decrement chance 
Reaction No Same as No Same as 
Time Increase change skill change Increase chance 
METHOD 
Design 
A 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design was used with the last 
factor, trials, treated as a repeated measure (Winer, 1962). 
There were three situations: skill, chance, and ambiguous, with 
a reward and non-reward condition for each. Each of the above 
groups was further subdivided into groups on the basis of the 
I-E dimension, producing a total of 12 groups with 15 Ss per 
group. 
Since there were two dependent variables, reaction time 
and expectancy, a separate analysis was done on each. 
Subjects 
One hundred and eighty female subjects (90 internals and 
90 externals) from Introductory Psychology classes at Kansas 
State University participated in the study. They were selected 
on the basis of their scores on the I-E scale (Rotter, 1966). 
The I-E scale was scored in the internal direction. The mean 
score was 15.68 (SD = 3.84) and the median was 16. Ss who 
_scored above the median of 16 were designated as internals and 
Ss who scored below the median were considered externals. 
Procedure 
A stratifying procedure was used to assign Ss to the 
various groups. For example, Ss who had identical scores on 
the I-E scale were assigned to groups so that each group had an 
equal number of Ss with identical scores. In this manner, the 
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Ss were evenly distributed across groups according to their 
scores on the I-E scale. In order to control for possible ex- 
perimenter bias, Ss were coded by a research assistant to pre- 
vent E from knowing which Ss were externals and which were in- 
ternals. 
The task consisted of predicting supposed children's re- 
sponses to a children's personality test. The Ss were shown 13 
cards; each card served as a trial. Each card contained two 
geometric figures and S had to state which of the two figures 
a child would choose as more friendly, aggressive, alert, etc. 
There was a total of 26 figures and 13 adjectives. Since one 
reinforcement schedule was used (see Table II), the figures 
and adjectives were paired in such a way as to make either a 
correct or incorrect answer plausible for those cards on which 
the S was to receive a negative reinforcement. At the end of the 
experiment, the S had the opportunity to ask for explanations 
of wrong answers. The cards and explanations are shown in 
Appendix B. The cards were presented in the same sequence to 
all Ss. 
The reward was introduced after the sixth card. The re- 
ward consisted of 4 extra experimental points that the Ss could 
add to their final point total in Introductory Psychology. The 
S was to receive the reward if her response to either Card 7 or 
8 was correct. Previous work by Phares (1965) indicated that 
this was both a credible and effective reward. As Table II 
indicates, Trials 7 and 8 were failure trials for all Ss. 
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Table II 
Reinforcement Sequence 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13' 
Reinforcement +* - - + - + + + + 
* + refers to success 
- refers to failure 
Expectancy statements and decision time were the depen- 
dent variables. Before S saw each card she was asked to state 
on an 11 point scale how confident she was that her judgment 
on the next card would be correct. The points along this scale 
were defined by E. Decision time was measured with.a standard 
stop watch. Timing began when S was handed the card and ended 
when she indicated the child's response to the card. Ss were 
told they would be timed but that there was no time limit. No 
explanation was given them for the timing. 
Instructions 
The wording of the instructions attempted to produce either 
a skill or chance set except in the case of the ambiguous groups 
where neither skill nor chance instructions were given to Ss. 
All reward groups received exactly, the same instructions when the 
reward was introduced after the sixth card. The verbatim in- 
structions are presented in Appendix C. 
RESULTS 
The average correlation between expectancy statements and 
decision time for Trials 7 and 8 was -.017. Thus, the finding 
- by Rotter and Mulry (1966), Barker (1946), and Lotsof (1956) 
that decision time was not influenced by expectancy was clearly 
confirmed. 
Expectancy Statements 
In order to test the hypotheses concerning introduction of 
reward, the mean of each S's first six expectancies was used as 
a correction factor for Trials 7 and 8. The correction pro- 
cedure consisted of subtracting the mean of each S's first six 
expectancies from her stated expectancy for Trial 7 and Trial 8. 
An analysis of variance was computed for the obtained mean dif- 
ference scores, treating Trials 7 and 8 as repeated measures. 
The data were corrected for initial mean expectancy in order to 
reduce any influence that differing initial expectancies might 
exert on Trials 7 and 8 in which the reward -nonreward condition 
was introduced. The corrected data are presented in Table III. 
The uncorrected data for all trials are presented in Table 
IV and are graphically summarized in Figure 1 for the skill, 
chance, and ambiguous situations under the reward and non- 
reward conditions. The expectancy level indicated for each trial 
refers to expectancy statements made prior to performance on 
that trial. 
The initial analysis of the corrected data for all three 
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Table III 
Corrected Expectancy Mean Difference Scores 
For Reward-(Nonreward) Trials 
Mean 
of 1-6 
Trial 
7 
Trial 
8 
N=15 4.93 +.07 -.53 
Internal 
N=15 (5.81) (+.65) (-.29) 
Skill 
N=15 5.47 -.20 -.87 
External 
N=15 (5.32) (-.25) (-.65) 
N=15 5.78 -.24 -.78 
Internal 
N=15 (5.63) (+.57) (-.10) 
Chance N=15 5.45 +.41 -.39 
External 
N=15 (5.34) (+. 66) (+.33) 
N=15 5.98 -.24 -.64 
Internal 
N=15 (5.47) (+.40) (-.14) 
Ambigu- 
ous External 
N=15 5.23 -.30 -1.10 
N=15 (5.49) (+.51) (-.29) 
Table IV 
Mean Expectancies for Internals and Externals 
In Skill, Chance and Ambiguous Situations 
Under the Reward- (Nonreward) Conditions 
Trials 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
4.933 5.866 5.400 4.000 5.000 4.400 5.000 4.400 3.666 4.400 5.000 4.466 5.066 
Internal 
(5.600) (6.733) (6.066) (5.066) (5.733) (5.733) (6.466) (5.533) (4.333) (5.800) (6.333) (5.066) (6.533) 
Skill 
4.866 6.200 5.866 5.133 5.600 5.133 5.266 4.600 4.200 5.333 5.866 5.066 5.866 
External 
(5.066) (5.933) (5.600) (4.800) (5.866) (4.666) (5.066) (4.666) (4.200) (5.200) (5.600) (5.066) (5.733) 
5.200 6.533 5.866 5.066 6.000 5.800 5.533 5.000 4.533 5.400 5.533 5.333 5.533 
Internal 
(5.666) (6.666) (5.800) (4.600) (6.066) (5.400) (6.200) (5.533) (4.400) (5.266) (6.333) (5.666) (6.333) 
Chance 
5.066 6.466 5.400 4.866 5.800 5.133 5.866 5.066 5.066 5.533 5.933 5.200 6.133 
External 
(4.533) (6.400) (5.600) (4.733) (5.800) (5.000) (6.000) (5.666) (4.800) (6.000) (6.066) (5.200) (6.200) 
6.066 6.733 6.000 5.266 6.266 5.466 5.733 5.333 5.122 5.800 6.066 5.933 6.466 
Internal 
(4.933) (6.266) (5.533) (5.000) (5.533) (5.533) (5.866) (5.333) (5.000) 5.200) (5.666) (5.333) (5.933) 
Ambiguous 
4.533 6.266 5.466 4.466 5.733 4.933 4.933 4.122 3.466 4.400 5.200 4.666 5.866 
External 
(5.066) (6.333) (5.466) (5.066) (5.933) (5.133) (6.000) (5.200) (4.600) (5.333) (6.066) (5.266) (5.933) 
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Fig. 1. Expectancy changes for skill, chance, and ambiguous groups under 
conditions of reward and noneeward. 
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situations under all conditions indicated that neither the 
situational factor (skill, chance, or ambiguous) nor the in- 
ternal-external factor showed significant effects (see Summary 
Table I). However, both Trials (F = 80.55; df = 1/168; 24.001) 
and the reward-nonreward condition (F = 13.191; df = 1/168; 
2 <.001) yielded highly significant effects. For all three 
situations, expectancies were lower for the reward than the non- 
reward groups. If the reward conditions had not been signifi- 
cant, it would not have been possible to test the predictions 
concerning expectancy changes following the introduction of a 
reward. 
Hypothesis I. Hypothesis I stated that there would be an 
interaction between the skill-chance dichotomy and the reward- 
nonreward condition. This hypothesis was based on the premise 
that introduction of reward following a success experience should 
result in a decrement in expectancy for the skill situation and 
no change in expectancy for the chance situation relative to the 
nonreward controls. In order to test this hypothesis, an analysis 
of variance was computed, using the corrected expectancy state- 
ments for only the skill-chance situational dichotomy. This 
procedure was equivalent to making orthogonal comparisons be- 
tween the skill and chance situations, ignoring for the moment 
the ambiguous situation. The results of the analysis are pre- 
sented in Summary Table II. Although Trials (F = 49.531; df =, 
1/112; P <.001) and the reward conditions (F = 6.956; df = 1/112; 2 .01) again showed highly significant effects, neither the 
skill-chance main effect nor the interaction between the skill- 
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Summary Table I 
Analysis of Variance of Corrected Expectancies 
Under the Reward Conditions 
SV DF SS MS F 
Between SS 179. 35595.300 
A 2. 711.500 355.750 1.940 
B 1. 2418.000 2418.000 13.191** 
C 1. 46.400 46.400 .253 
AB 2. 322.100 161.050 .878 
AC 2. 1094.200 547.100 2.984 
BC 1. 28.100 28.100 .153 
ABC 2. 181.700 90.850 .495 
SS/GPS 168. 30793.300 183.293 
Within SS 180. 11150.200 
T 1. 3518.100 3518.100 80.553** 
AT 2. 8.500 4.250 .097 
BT 1. 1.600 1.600 .036 
CT 1. .600 .600 .013 
ABT 2. 22.800 11.400 .261 
ACT 2. 130.700 65.350 1.496 
BCT 1. 105.900 105.900 2.424 
ABCT 2. 24.800 12.400 .283 
TXSS/GPS 168. 7337.200 43.673 
Total 359. 46745.500 
** p < .001 
For all tables: 
A = situation 
B = reward-nonreward 
C = I - E 
T = trials 
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Summary Table II 
Expectancy Changes for Trials 7 and 8 
for the Skill and Chance Situations 
SV DF SS MS 
Between SS 119. 21302.000 
A 1. 619.400 619.400 3.824* 
B 1. 1126.600 1126.600 6.956** 
C 1. 7.300 7.300 .045 
AB 1. 192.200 192.200 1.186 
AC 1. 1070.400 1070.400 6.609** 
BC 1. 145.500 145.500 .898 
ABC 1. 2.200 2.200 .013 
SS/GPS 112. 18138.400 161.950 
Within SS 120. 7754.500 
T 1. 2315.000 2315.000 49.531*** 
AT 1. 8.300 8.300 .177 
BT 1. 8.100 8.100 .173 
CT 1. 30.600 30.600 .654 
ABT 1. 12.800 12.800 .273 
ACT 1. 17.200 17.200 .368 
BCT 1. 128.300 128.300 2.745 
ABCT 1. -.5001 -.500 -.010 
TXSS/GPS 112. 5234.700 46.738 
Total 239. 29056.500 
* p < .10 
** p 4. .05 
*** p G .01 
1. The negative sum of squa'res for the ABCT interaction is the 
result of machine rounding error. 
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chance dichotomy and reward-nonreward was confirmed. It is clear 
from Figure 1 that in both the skill and chance reward groups 
there was an initial increase in expectancy for success for Trial 
7 and a subsequent decrease in expectancy for success on Trial 8. 
Although the expected interaction did not occur, there was 
a difference of borderline significance (F = 3.824; df = 1/112;. 
p. .10) between the skill and chance situations. Apparently 
the use of instructional set to produce either a skill or chance 
orientation was only partially successful. Since no instruc- 
tional set was used for the ambiguous situation, this situation 
could be used to determine how the task was perceived indepen- 
dently of instructional manipulation. The comparison between the 
corrected mean expectancy changes for the skill, ambiguous, and 
chance situations showed mean changes of -.26, -.25, and -.06 
respectively. It appears as if the task was perceived as in- 
volving skill factors. 
Hypothesis IV. Hypothesis IV stated that following the in- 
troduction of reward there would be a second order interaction 
between the situation, reward-nonreward, and internal-external 
control. Specifically, internals in the skill and ambiguous 
situations and externals in the chance and ambiguous situations 
were expected to show a decrement in expectancies following the 
introduction of reward. However, internals in the chance situa- ' 
tion and externals in the skill situation were expected to show 
no change relative to the non-reward controls (see Table I). This 
interaction between the situations, the I-E dimension, and reward- 
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nonreward also failed to be confirmed (see Summary Table II). 
The pooled mean expectancy changes for the reward and nonreward 
trials are presented in Table V. Clearly, the data are in the 
predicted direction except for (a) the internals in the chance- 
reward situation who show a mean decrease in expectancy of -.51 
whereas the nonreward controls show a mean increase of +.25, and 
(b) the externals in the skill nonreward condition who show a 
mean decrease of -.45 whereas all other nonreward groups show 
mean increases in expectancy ranging from +.11 to +.51. A com- 
parison of the reward groups yields the rather interesting 
finding that externals in the chance-reward group showed a cor- 
rected mean increase in expectancy of +.01 while all the other 
reward groups, including the external-ambiguous-reward group, 
showed mean decreases ranging from -.23 to -.70. Also, contrasting 
the mean decreases in expectancy by externals in the skill and 
ambiguous reward groups with the mean increase in expectancy by 
externals in the chance-reward group, one obtains further evidence 
that the task was perceived as involving essentially skill fac- 
tors when no attempt at instructional set was made by E. 
Hypothesis III. Hypothesis III stated that prior to the 
introduction of reward, there would be an interaction between the 
skill-chance dichotomy and internal-external control. This 
hypothesis was based on the premise that internals would have 
higher expectancies in the skill than in the chance situation 
while externals would have higher expectancies in the chance than 
skill situation. Although the analysis of the corrected mean ex- 
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pectancy change for the skill and chance situations over Trials 
7 & 8 (see Summary Table II) showed a significant interaction 
between the situational dichotomy and the I-E dimension (F = 
6.609; df 1/112; 24.025), this was not a direct test of the 
hypothesis since (a) the data represent expectancy change rather 
than absolute expectancy, and (b) the interaction represents 
effects which are pooled across the highly significant reward- 
nonreward conditions. 
Table V 
Corrected Mean Expectancy Change in Skill, Chance, 
and Ambiguous Situations for Internal and 
External Subjects Under the Reward and 
(Nonreward) Conditions 
SKILL CHANCE AMBIGUOUS 
I E I E I E 
-.23 -.54 -.51 +.01 -.44 -.70 
(+.18) (-.45) (+.25) (+.50) (+.26) (+.11) 
A direct test of Hypothesis II was made by analyzing Ss' 
expectancy statements prior to the introduction of reward. 
The results of the analysis are shown in Summary Table III. 
There is no indication of a significant interaction between 
the situational dichotomy and the I-E dimension. The analySis 
also shows that there was no difference of any significance be- 
tween either the skill, ambiguous, and chance situations, or the 
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Summary Table III 
Analysis of Variance of Expectancy Data 
Prior to Introduction of Reward 
SV DF SS MS 
Between SS 179. 1506.596 
A 2. 6.624 3.312 .389 
B 1. .948 .948 .111 
C 1. 12.892 12.892 1.516 
AB 2. 13.291 6.645 .781 
AC 2. 7.503 3.751 .441 
BC 1. .834 .834 .098 
ABC 2. 36.516 18.258 2.148 
SS/GPS 168. 1427.988 8.499 
Within SS 900. 1025.390 
T 5. 274.830 54.966 65.308** 
AT 10. 7.398 .739 .879 
BT 5. .274 .054 .065 
CT 5. 11.086 2.217 2.634* 
ABT 10. 5.887 .588 .699 
ACT 10. 3.786 .378 .449 
BCT 5. 2.766 .553 .657 
ABCT 10. 12.391 1.239 1.472 
TXSS/GPS 840. 706.972 .841 
Total 1079. 2531.986 
* P < .025 
** p < .01 
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reward and nonreward groups. Since there were no differences be- 
tween the reward and nonreward groups prior to the introduction 
of reward, the highly significant effect resulting from the in- 
troduction of reward on Trials 7 & 8 was not confounded by any 
differences between the groups prior to the introduction of re- 
ward. 
The analysis did, however, indicate a significant Trials 
effect (F = 65.308; df = 5/840; .24.001) and a significant in- 
teraction between Trials and internal-external control (F = 
2.634; df = 5/840; 2,< .025). The interaction is graphically 
summarized in Figure 2, and an LSD test of significant dif- 
ferences indicated that internals and externals had signifi- 
cantly different expectancies (p .05) for only Trials 1 & 6. 
A closer look at the data also indicated that this interaction 
was due to the higher expectancies of internals as compared with 
the lower expectancies of externals in the ambiguous situation. 
Also, an analysis of the first six expectancy statements for 
Ss in only the skill and chance situations yielded no significant 
interaction between internal-external control and Trials. 
Other results. In order to determine whether the intro- 
duction of reward had any effect on subsequent trials, an analysis 
of variance was computed for all the trials following the last 
reward trial, i.e. Trials 9-13. The analysis, which is shown in 
Summary Table IV, indicated (a) a significant interaction between 
the situations, the I-E dimension, and the reward-nonreward con- 
ditions (F = 3.153; df = 2/168; p < .05), and (b) an interaction 
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Summary Table IV 
Analysis of Expectancy Data 
for Trials 9-13 
SV DF SS MS 
Between SS 179. 1553.710 
A 2. 22.286 11.143 1.312 
B 1. 17.361 17.361 2.045 
C 1. 1.520 1.520 .179 
AB 2. 5.429 2.714 .319 
AC 2. 27.177 13.588 1.600 
BC 1. .491 .491 .057 
ABC 2. 53.526 26.763 3.153** 
SS/GPS 168. 1425.920 8.487 
Within 720. 837.200 
T 4. 256.593 64.148 79.735*** 
AT 8. 6.447 .805 1.001 
BT 4. 1.767 .441 .549 
CT 4. 1.452 .363 .451 
ABT 8. 8.727 1.090 1.355 
ACT 8. 11.468 1.433 1.781* 
BCT 4. 5.326 1.331 1.655 
ABCT 8. 4.790 .598 .744 
TXSS/GPS 672. 540.630 .804 
Total 899. 2390.910 
*p < .10 
** p < .05 
***p < .001 
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Fig. 2. Mean expectancies of internal and external subjects. 
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of borderline significance between the situation, internal- 
external control, and Trials (F = 1.781; df = 8/672; £ <.10). 
The means relative to the first interaction are presented 
in Table VI. An LSD test of significant differences showed 
both the internal-skill-reward and external-ambiguous-reward 
groups to have significantly (2 .05) lower mean expectancies 
than (a) the internal-skill-nonreward group, (b) internals and 
externals in the chance nonreward groups, and (c) the internal- 
ambiguous-reward group. The data for the reward groups is 
graphically presented in Figure 3. The internal-skill-reward 
group had lower expectancies than the external-skill-reward 
group on the two trials immediately before the introduction of 
reward and for all trials following the introduction of reward. 
The external-chance-reward group, however, increased its ex- 
pectancies following the introduction of reward to the point 
where the externals in this group had higher expectancies for 
success than any other skill or chance-reward group. 
The interaction between the situations, ID, and Trials is 
graphically summarized in Figure 4. The figure shows that for the 
skill situation the results are in complete opposition to the 
presumption that internals might have higher expectancies than 
externals in the skill situationqsee Hypothesis IV). In 
short, for Trials 9-13, externals have higher expectancies than 
internals for success in the skill situation. The data forthe 
chance situation are in the expected direction since it could 
be presumed that externals would show a higher expectancy for 
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Fig. 3. Mean expectancies for internal and external subjects in the skill, 
chance, and ambiguous situations under the reward condition. 
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Fig. 4. Expectancy statements for internal and external subjects in skill and 
chance situations. 
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success in the chance situation than internals in the same 
situation. 
Table VI 
Mean Expectancy in Skill, Chance, and Ambiguous 
Situations for Internal and External Subjects 
in the Reward and (Nonreward) Conditions 
for Trials 9-13 
SKILL AMBIGUOUS CHANCE 
4.42 5.26 5.88 4.72 5.26 5.57 
(5.61) (5.16) (5.43) (5.43) (5.59) (5.65) 
LSD = .79 
Decision Time 
As in the case of the expectancy data, mean difference 
scores were used for the analysis of Trials 7 & 8 in order to 
test the hypothesis concerning decision time and the introduc- 
tion of reward. The corrected data are presented in Table VII. 
The uncorrected data are shown in Table VIII and are graphical- 
ly summarized for all three situations under the reward-non- 
reward conditions in Figure 5. 
The initial analysis of the corrected data for all three 
situations under all conditions shows neither a significant, 
situational nor internal-external control effect. However, the 
reward factor (F = 18.265; df = 1/168; l 4.001) and Trials 
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Table VII 
Corrected Decision Time (in seconds) Mean 
Difference Scores for Reward- (Nonreward) Trials 
Mean 
oft -6 
Trial 
7 
Trial 
8 
N=15 5.17 +2.74 5.85 
Internal 
N=15 (5.27) (- .11) (1.22) 
Skill 
N=15 5.49 + .55 4.05 
External 
N=15 (5.44) (+1.02) (2.01) 
N=15 4.59 +1.86 1.91 
Internal 
N=15 (5.37) (- .07) ( .85) 
Chance 
N=15 6.16 + .83 4.12 
External 
N=15 (5.21) (- .06) (1.82) 
N=15 5.38 +1.98 2.6;; 
Internal 
N=15 (5.58) (- .81) (1.12) 
Ambigu- 
ous N=15 4.17 + .80 2.27 
External 
N=15 4.85 .03) (1.67) 
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Table VIII 
Mean Decision Times for Internals and Externals 
In Skill, Chance and Ambiguous Situations 
Under the Reward- (Nonreward) Conditions 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
5.600 5.026 4.053 4.033 5.713 6.613 7.013 11.020 6.353 6.706 7.320 6.326 4.300 
Internal 
(6.280) (4.720) (4.133) (4.846) (4.973) (6.666) (5.160) (6.493) (5.740) (5.000) (5.880) (5.366) (4.200) 
Skill 
5.073 5.100 4.140 5.046 5.993 7.660 6.033 9.533 6.453 6.433 5.800 6.593 3.833 
External 
(4.433) (5.820) (4.200) (5.386) (5.400) (7.373) (6.460) (7.446) (8.546) (6.953) (7.833) (6.333) (4.326) 
4.693 4.808 4.160 3.980 5.186 5.426 6.446 6.493 5.140 6.000 5.526 4.406 3.066 
Internal 
(5.780) (5.686) (4.360) (4.193) (4.833) (7.373) (5.306) (6.213) (6.433) (5.986) (4.800) (4.700) (3.126) 
Chance 
6.326 6.133 4.326 6.080 6.900 7.206 6.993 10.293 5.840 6.133 6.880 4.906 3.566 
External 
(4.786) (4.413) (4.086) (4.446) (6.553) (6.986) (5.153) (7.026) (4.693) (5.440) (5.413) (5.606) (3.393) 
5.893 4.940 5.026 4.786 4.633 7.013 7.366 8.026 5.160 5.460 4.853 5.073 3.740 
Internal 
(4.706) (5.700) (3.986) (5.006) (6.046) (8.040) (4.773) (6.706) (6.653) (5.253) (5.606) (6.733) (3.346) 
Ambiguous 
4.653 4.053 3.206 3.560 4.040 4.813 4.973 6.446 4.700 4.753 4.566 4.326 3.333 
External 
(4.440) (5.233) (3.146) (4.066) (6.440) (5.126) (4.833) (6.526) (5.433) (3.606) (4.946) (5.200) (2.726) 
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Fig. 5. Mean decision time for the skill and chance situations under the reward 
and nonreward conditions. 
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(F = 28.481; df = 1/168; E:.001), as with the expectancy data, 
show highly significant effects (see Summary Table VI). In all 
three situations, decision time was longer for the reward than 
the nonreward groups. 
Hypothesis II. Hypothesis II stated that following the 
introduction of reward there would be an interaction between the 
skill-chance dichotomy and reward-nonreward. This hypothesis 
was based on the premise that following the introduction of re- 
ward, decision time would increase more in the skill than in the 
chance situation relative to the non-reward controls. In order 
to test this hypothesis, an analysis of the corrected decision 
time data for only the skill and chance situations was computed. 
The results are presented in Summary Table VI. Although the 
reward factor (F = 13.715; df = 1/112; P < .001) and Trials 
(F = 20.042; df = 1/112; P <.001) were highly significant, the 
predicted interaction between the skill-chance dichotomy and 
reward-nonreward was not confirmed. However, Figure 5 suggests 
that the changes were, at least, in the predicted direction. 
Hypothesis IV. Hypothesis IV stated that following the in- 
troduction of reward there would be a second order interaction 
between the situations, reward-nonreward, and internal-external 
control. This was based on the premise that internals would 
increase their decision time following the introduction of re- 
ward in a skill situation and show no change in the chance 
situation. Externals, on the other hand, should show an in- 
crease in decision time following the introduction of reward in 
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Summary Table V 
Analysis of Variance of Corrected Decision Times 
Under the Reward Conditions 
SV DF SS MS F 
Between SS 179. 301147.000 
A 2. 6218.800 3109.400 2.038 
B 1. 27857.300 27857.300 18.265*** 
C 1. 3.200 3.200 .002 
AB 2. 1134.900 567.450 .372 
AC 2. 1645.600 822.800 .539 
BC 1. 4646.800 4646.800 3.046 
ABC 2. 3414.500 1707.250 1.119 
SS/GPS 168. 256225.900 1525.154 
Within SS 180. 198854.200 
T 1. 27443.600 27443.600 28.481*** 
AT 2. 1058.900 529.450 .549 
BT 1. 698.800 698.800 .725 
CT 1. 1448.800 1448.800 1.503 
ABT 2. 3283.500 1641.750 1.703 
ACT 2. 1832.200 916.100 .950 
BCT 1. 968.600 968.600 1.005 
ABCT 2. 240.300 120.150 .124 
TXSS/GPS 168. 161879.500 963.568 
Total 359. 500001.200 
*** p < .001 
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Summary Table VI 
Reaction Time Anges for Trials 7 and 8 
for the Skill and Chance Situations 
SV DF SS MS F 
Between SS 119. 214128.900 
A 1. 3409.500 3409.500 2.134 
B 1. 21907.700 21907.700 13.715*** 
C 1. .200 .200 0.000 
AB 1. 721.800 721.800 .451 
AC 1. 1632.800 1632.800 1.022 
BC 1. 3142.100 3142.100 1.967 
ABC 1. 3414.100 3414.100 2.137 
SS/GPS 112. 178900.700 1597.327 
Within SS 120. 149501.200 
T 1. 21409.800 21409.800 2'0.042*** 
AT 1. 692.400 692.400 .648 
BT 1. 2257.000 2257.000 2.112 
CT 1. 1631.800 1631.800 1.527 
ABT 1. 1267.600 1267.600 1.186 
ACT 1. 1571.700 1571.700 1.471 
BCT 1. 825.200 825.200 .772 
ABCT 1. 206.600 206.600 .193 
TXSS/GPS 112. 119639.100 1068.206 
Total 239. 362630.100 
*** p .001 
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the chance situation and show no change in the skill situation. 
Since the analysis of the corrected data did not indicate a 
significant interaction between the situation, internal-external 
control, and reward-nonreward, neither of these predictions was 
confirmed. Again, however, the data which are graphically sum- 
marized in Figure 6 were in the predicted direction. In the 
skill situation, internals showed a steady increase in decision 
time over the two reward trials; the externals, however, showed 
an initial decrease in decision time for the first reward trial 
and then a large increase for the last reward trial. In the 
chance situation, the internals showed an increase in decision 
time for the first reward trial and no change for the last re- 
ward trial; the externals, however, showed a small decrease 
followed by a large increase for the two respective reward 
trials. 
Hypothesis III. Hypothesis III stated that there would 
be an interaction between the situations and internal-external 
control. This was based on the premise that internals would 
have longer decision times in skill situations as opposed to 
chance situations, while, conversely, externals would have longer 
decision times in chance situations as opposed to skill situa- 
tions. The analysis, which is presented in Summary Table VII, 
-shows a significant interaction between the situation and the 
I-E dimension (F = 3.298; df = 2/168; p 4.05) as well as asig- 
nificant Trials effect (F = 23.391; df = 5/840; 2<.001). The 
mean decision times for the first six trials for internals and 
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Summary Table VII 
Analysis of Variance for Decision Time 
Prior to Introduction of Reward 
SV DF SS MS 
Between SS 179. 4252.341 
A 2. 38.290 19.145 .810 
B 1. 4.217 4.217 .178 
C 1. .494 .494 .020 
AB 2. 14.119 7.059 .299 
AC 2. 155.718 77.859 3.298** 
BC 1. 14.865 14.865 .629 
ABC 2. 58.709 29.354 1.243 
SS/GPS 168. 3965.929 23.606 
Within SS 900. 6166.808 
T 5. 717.564 143.512 23.391*** 
AT 10. 13.933 1.393 .227 
BT 5. 21.672 4.334 .706 
CT 5. 49.636 9.927 1.618 
ABT 10. 83.228 8.322 1.356 
ACT 10. 76.811 7.681 1.251 
BCT 5. 20.697 4.139 .674 
ABCT 10. 29.716 2.971 .484 
TXSS /GPS 840. 5153.551 6.135 
Total 1079. 10419.149 
* *p < .05 
*** p < .001 
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externals in all three situations are shown in Table IX. An 
LSD test of significant differences indicated that the inter- 
action was due to the low mean decision time of the externals 
in the ambiguous situation which is significantly lower (2,4.05) 
than all other groups except the internal skill and chance 
groups. No other means were significantly different from each 
other. Since the analysis also shows no situational, internal- 
external control, nor reward-nonreward effects prior to the in- 
troduction of reward, there is no firm evidence that the inter- 
action between the situation and the I-E dimension negated the 
predictions concerning the reward trials. It should be noted, 
however, that although the differences were not significant, the 
internals had a lower mean decision time than externals in the 
skill situation. This is in the opposite direction from the pre- 
diction that internals would have longer decision times than ex- 
ternals in the skill situation. The mean decision times for 
internals and externals in the chance situation are in the pre- 
dicted direction since Hypothesis III stated that externals 
should have longer decision times than internals in the chance 
situation. 
Other results. As with the expectancy data, a final analy- 
sis was made on Trials 9-13 to determine whether or not the in- 
troduction of reward had any effect on subsequent trials for which 
no reward was possible. The analysis, presented in Summary. 
Table VIII, indicated a significant Trials effect (F = 34.386; 
df = 4/672; 2. < .001) and a highly significant situational effect 
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Summary Table VIII 
Analysis of Variance for Trials 9-13 
of the Decision Time Data 
SV DF SS MS 
Between SS 179. 4166.506 
A 2. 254.438 127.219 5.731* 
B 1. .744 .744 .033 
C 1. .023 .023 .001 
AB 2. 11.288 5.644 .254 
AC 2. 83.117 41.558 1.872 
BC 1. 2.163 2.163 .097 
ABC 2. 85.680 42.840 1.930 
SS/GPS 168. 3729.053 22.196 
Within SS 720. 4192.804 
T 4. 671.952 167.988 34.386** 
AT 8. 52.181 6.522 1.335 
BT 4. 38.561 9.640 1.973 
CT 4. 4.747 1.186 .242 
ABT 8. 52.223 6.527 1.336 
ACT 8. 48.210 6.026 1.233 
BCT 4. 5.721 1.430 .292 
ABCT 8. 36.306 4.538 .928 
TXSS/GPS 672. 3282.903 4.885 
Total 899. 8359.310 
* p 4 .01 
** p ( .001 
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(F = 5.731; df = 2/168; 2 4.01). Although the situation had not 
been an effective variable prior to the introduction of reward 
nor for the two reward.trials, it was an effective variable for 
all trials after the last reward trial. The mean decision times 
for the skill, chance, and ambiguous situations were 6.10, 4.55, 
and 4.75 respectively. An LSD test (LSD = .559) indicated that, 
while not significantly different from each other, both the 
chance and ambiguous situations led to significantly (2.4.01) 
lower mean decision times than the skill situation for the last 
5 trials. 
Table IX 
Mean Decision Time of Internal and External Subjects 
in the Skill, Chance, and Ambiguous 
Situations over Trials 1-6 
SKILL AMBIGUOUS CHANCE 
I 5.22 5.49 5.04 
E 5.47 4.39 5.68 
LSD = 1.01 
DISCUSSION 
Of immediate concern to Rotter's social learning theory is 
the finding that in this experimental situation there was no 
correlation between expectancy and reinforcement value over the 
two reward trials. This finding offers further evidence in 
support of Rotter's assumption that expectancy and reinforce- 
ment value are independent. However, the current study, in 
confirming an assumption of Rotter's theory and then failing to 
confirm hypotheses presumably derived from this theory, neces- 
sitates a cautious interpretation of the finding that expec- 
tancy and reinforcement value were independent in this study. 
Perhaps the current experimental design was an inadequate test 
of the hypotheses. However, further research is necessary to 
investigate the relationship between this assumption of Rot- 
ter's and the hypotheses which can be derived from his theory. 
In short, there is no guarantee that expectancy and reinforce- 
ment value would remain independent if the other predictions 
derived from Rotter's theory had been confirmed. 
Expectancy 
The finding that introduction of reward in either skill, 
chance, or ambiguous situations results in a decrement in ex- 
pectancies for all three situations was in agreement with the 
earlier results obtained by Phares (1965). There are at least 
two explanations for the present results. The first is simply 
that the use of instructional set was not successful as regards 
the chance groups. Since the task involved the prediction of a 
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child's responses, there may have been a certain amount of re- 
luctance on the part of female Ss, who are expected on a cul- 
tural basis to be knowledgable about children, to perceive the 
situation as one entirely consisting of chance or luck factors. 
Since the data show no difference between the decision times 
or expectancies in the skill, chance, or ambiguous situations 
prior to the introduction of reward, there is some evidence that 
S's in the chance situation may have failed to assume a chance 
set. Phares' findings (1957, 1965) that there were clear dif- 
ferences between expectancy statements in skill and chance sit- 
uations adds support to this conclusion. The similarity of the 
means for the ambiguous and skill situations also suggests that, 
despite its novelty, the task was perceived as primarily con- 
trolled by skill factors. However, the difference between the 
expectancy changes for the skill and chance situations for the 
two reward trials indicates that, at least for the reward trials, 
the skill and chance sets may have been operative. Thus, al- 
though the situational dichotomy was perhaps not effectively 
created for the trials prior to the introduction of reward, the 
introduction of reward apparently increased the importance of 
the situation to the point where a skill-chance distinction was 
at least partially effective. 
The second possible explanation of the decrement in ex- 
pectancies for the reward trials involves the cultural signifi- 
cance of reward. Since the attainment of reward is highly re- 
garded in our culture, it may be that the opportunity for re- 
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ward over-rides the skill-chance dichotomy and results in a 
decrement in expectancy no matter how the situation is structured. 
Although the expectancy changes for the skill situation were 
lower than those of the chance situation for Trials 7 and 8, 
the fact that both situations showed decrements lends support 
to the notion that a reward may, have the ability to over-ride 
either a skill or chance set and to produce defensive reactions 
in both situations. 
Although no predictions were made concerning expectancy 
statements following the last reward trial, the highly signifi- 
cant interaction of the situational set with the I-E personality 
dimension and reward-nonreward makes a certain amount of sense. 
Since internals perceive reinforcement as contingent upon their 
own behavior, and are therefore skill oriented, they might (and 
do in the present experimental situation) have lower expec- 
tancies for the trials following failure to obtain a reward than 
externals who perceive reinforcement as contingent upon others 
or luck factors. In short, because of their skill orientation, 
internals in a skill situation may perceive failure as a per- 
sonal failure reflecting a lack of competence and thus react 
more defensively by lowering their expectancies on subsequent 
trials. The chance oriented externals, however, may have simply 
perceived failure as meaning that they were not lucky on that 
trial. 
Applying the same reasoning to the chance situation after 
failure to obtain a reward, one would expect the externals to 
have lower expectancies due to defensive reactions since they are 
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concerned with whether or not they are lucky. Internals, on the 
other hand, would not be expected to be defensive since they are 
in a chance situation and are thus relieved of the responsibility 
to be skillful. However, the opposite occurred as internals had 
lower expectancies than externals. This may indicate that failure 
to obtain a reward in any situation is taken as a personal failure 
by an internal since he views reinforcement as contingent upon 
his own behavior. However, externals do not have to feel defen- 
sive, or react as if they had failed, since they themselves are 
not personally responsible for the failure; i.e. failure was sim- 
ply a matter of chance and their actions made little or no dif- 
ference. Such an interpretation leads to the hypothesis that the 
generalized expectancy toward chance events that is assumed by an 
external is a defensive orientation since it frees the individual 
from assuming responsibility for his failures no matter how the 
situation is structured. An external orientation may also permit 
"wishful thinking" such as that exhibited by the externals in the 
chance-reward group when they showed a mean increase over the re- 
ward trials whereas the other reward groups showed mean decreases 
in expectancy. If this general interpretation is correct, it 
would explain why the interaction between the situation, internal- 
external control, and Trials 9-13, (the trials following the last 
reward trial) indicated that externals had higher expectancies 
in both the skill and chance situations. 
Reinforcement value 
Neither of the major predictions concerning reinforcement 
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value or decision time were confirmed. Reinforcement value did 
not increase significantly more in the skill than in the chance 
situation following the introduction of reward. The reinforce- 
ment value of a reward in a skill situation was not significantly 
greater than the reinforcement value of a reward in a chance 
situation for internally oriented Ss. And the reinforcement value 
of a reward in a chance situation was not greater than the rein- 
forcement value of a reward in a skill situation for externally 
oriented Ss. The data were, however, in the predicted direction. 
Again the major finding of interest concerned Trials 9-13, 
or the trials after the failure to obtain a reward. Specifically, 
the opportunity for reward and the failure to obtain that reward 
resulted in a significantly longer decision time in the skill 
situation as opposed to the chance situation. Apparently failure 
to obtain a reward increased Ss' reliance on the instructional 
set toward either skill or chance to the extent that success in 
a skill situation, which directly challenged S's competency, had 
greater reinforcement value than success,in a chance situation, 
which did not challenge Ss' competency. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the data indicated no relationship between expec- 
tancy and reinforcement value, no firm theoretical conclusions 
can be drawn about the independence of expectancy and reinforce- 
ment value since the other predictions, which were also derived 
from Rotter's social learning theory, were not confirmed. 
The major significance of this study lies in the findings 
that following a failure to obtain a reward (a) internals react 
defensively by lowering their expectancies for success in both 
skill and chance situations whereas externals appear to be free 
of responsibility for failure in both situations; and (b) the re- 
inforcement value of a skill situation is significantly greater 
than the reinforcement value of a chance situation. In light of 
these findings it would be advisable for future investigators to 
study the effects of failure more carefully. Such studies would 
help to clarify the post hoc hypothesis offered by this study 
that an external orientation, which views reinforcement as con- 
tingent upon others or luck factors rather than one's own actions, 
is a defensive orientation which frees the Ss from responsibility 
for failure. 
Also, in the attempt to clarify the reinforcing value of skill 
or chance situations to internal and external Ss, it might be ad- 
visable for future investigators to use a more representative ap- 
proach. In other words, rather than try to create either a skill 
or chance orientation for the same task, they might give the Ss 
their choice of a variety of tasks ranging from those involving a 
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high degree of skill to those which are pure chance. Studying 
the effect of introduction of reward in such a representative de- 
sign might prove more fruitful than the approach used in the pre- 
sent study. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Social Reaction Inventory 
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which cer- 
tain important events in our society affect different people. 
Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. 
Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which 
you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're con- 
cerned. Be sure to select the one you actually believe to be 
more true than the one you think you should choose or the one 
you would like to be true. This is a measure of personal be- 
lief: obviously there are no right or wrong answers. 
Your answers to the items on this inventory are to be re- 
corded on a separate answer sheet which is loosely inserted in 
the booklet. REMOVE THIS AN'WER SHEET NOW. Print your name and 
any other information requested by the examiner on the answer 
sheet, then finish reading these directions. Do not open the 
booklet until you are told to do so. 
Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too 
much time on any one item. Be sure to find an answer for every 
choice. Find the number of the item on the answer sheet and 
black-in the space under the number 1 or 2 which you choose as 
the statement most true. 
In some instances you may discover that you believe both 
statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the 
one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're 
concerned. Also, try to respond to each item independently when 
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making your choice; do not be influenced by your previous 
choices. 
Remember 
Select that alternative which you personally believe to be 
more true. 
I more strongly believe that: 
1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish 
them too much. 
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their 
parents are too easy with them. 
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly 
due to bad luck. 
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because 
people don't take enough interest in politics. 
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try 
to prevent them. 
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in 
this world. 
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes un- 
recognized no matter how hard he tries. 
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. 
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their 
grades are influenced by accidental happenings. 
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective 
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leader. 
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken 
advantage of their opportunities. 
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. 
b. People who can't get others to like them don't under- 
stand how to get along with others. 
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's per- 
sonality. 
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what he 
is like. 
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will hap- 
pen. 
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as 
making a decision to take a definite course of action. 
10. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely 
if ever such a thing as an unfair test. 
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to 
course work that studying is useless. 
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has 
little to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right 
place at the right time. 
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government 
decisions. 
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there 
is not much the little guy can do about it. 
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13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make 
them work. 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many 
things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune 
anyhow. 
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good. 
b. There is some good in everybody. 
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to 
do with luck. 
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by 
flipping a coin. 
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky 
enough to be in the right place first. 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, 
luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the 
victims of forces we can neither understand nor control. 
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs 
the people can control world events. 
18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their 
lives are controlled by accidental happenings. 
b. There really is no such thing as "luck." 
19. a. One should always be willing to admit his mistakes. 
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes 
you. 
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b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a per- 
son you are. 
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are 
balanced by the good ones. 
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ig- 
norance, laziness, or all three. 
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over 
the things politicians do in office. 
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the 
grades they give. 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study 
and the grades I get. 
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves 
what they should do. 
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their 
jobs are. 
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over 
the things that happen to me. 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck 
plays an important role in my life. 
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. 
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please 
people, if they like you, they like you. 
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school. 
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
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b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over 
the direction my life is taking. 
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians 
behave the way they do. 
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad 
government on a national as well as on a local level.- 
Appendix B 
The figure and adjective pairings for each trial are pre- 
sented below. In those trials on which the Ss were correct no 
alternative explanations were ever offered or requested. The ex- 
planations for those cards on which the S was to be negatively re- 
inforced no matter which card she chose are listed and were given 
after completion of the experiment. 
CARD I 
CARD II 
0 0 
WHICH IS MORE ALERT 
WHICH IS MORE FRIENDLY 
If S chose the left figure, she was told that children chose 
the right figure because it looked softer and not like it was 
reaching out to grab them. 
If S chose the right figure, she was told that children pre- 
ferred the left one because it looked more outgoing than the one 
on the right. 
CARD III 0 
WHICH IS MORE.GENEROUS 
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If S chose the left figure, she was told that children pre- 
ferred the right because it looked bigger and friendlier. 
If S chose the right figure, she was told that children 
felt the left looked like it had given up more than the larger 
right figure and was, therefore, more generous. 
CARD IV 
CARD V 
Z=i 
WHICH IS MORE CURIOUS 
WHICH IS MORE POWERFUL 
If S chose the left figure she was told that the larger 
triangle with the pointed edges looked more powerful than the 
smaller circle with smooth edges. 
If S chose the right figure she was told that the black 
color of the circle made it look more solid and powerful than 
the white color of the triangle. 
CARD VI 
CARD VII 
WHICH IS MORE STUBBORN 
WHICH IS MORE AGGRESSIVE 
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If S chose the figure on the right she was told that the 
red color of the circle made it look more aggressive than the 
white color of the triangle. 
If S chose the figure on the left, she was told that the 
larger triangle with the pointed edges was more aggressive than 
the smaller circle with smooth edges. 
CARD VIII 
WHICH IS MORE CREATIVE 
If S chose the figure on the left, she was told that the 
circle looked more confined than the figure with the squiggley 
perimeter. 
If S chose the figure on the left, she was told that the 
smooth circle looked neater than the uneven circle so children 
chose it as the more creative. 
CARD IX 
CARD X 
0 
WHICH IS MORE SELF-CONFIDENT 
0 0 
WHICH IS MORE PASSIVE 
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CARD XI 
WHICH IS MORE INTELLIGENT 
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If S chose the rigure on the left, she was told that the 
children felt the extra slot of the right hand figure made it 
look more complex and thus more intelligent to children. 
If S chose the right figure, she was told that the sym- 
metry of the left hand figure made it look more intelligent. 
CARD XII 
CARD XIII 
WHICH IS MORE CAREFREE 
WHICH IS MORE ORGANIZED 
Appendix C 
Instructions 
We are doing a series of experiments to determine whether 
or not it is possible for college women to predict a child's re- 
sponses to a children's personality test. The test consists of 
a series of paired geometrical figures and the child is asked to 
select the figure that is more friendly, aggressive, etc. 
(For Skill Group only) Previous studies have shown that some 
people have a special skill or ability that enables them to pre- 
dict the child's responses consistently better than others. In 
fact, some Education Boards are now using a procedure similar to 
this as part of their selection process in order to hire teachers 
who will be more understanding and effective with children. 
(For Chance Group only) Previous studies have shown that 
there is no special ability or skill that enables one to predict 
the child's responses. In fact, Education Boards that previously 
used them now refuse to use such a test in their selection of 
teachers because the results are entirely due to chance or luck 
factors. Although the results are due to chance factors, we have 
asked you to participate in this experiment in order to complete 
design requirements of an experiment sponsored by a government 
grant. 
This is how the test will run. I will give you a series of 
13 cards. Each card will contain two geometrical figures and I 
will ask you to judge which of the two figures was chosen as more 
friendly, aggressive, etc., by the children. In each case I will 
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tell you if your judgment is correct or not. At the end of the 
test I will explain the children's responses to any of the figures 
you do not judge correctly. Do you have any questions? 
Another thing, we are also interested in how confident you 
feel about your judgment. Therefore, before you look at each 
card, I will ask you how confident you are of making the correct 
judgment. You can indicate this on a number scale ranging from 0 
to 10. For example, if you feel very confident you might rate 
yourself with a 9 or 10. If you feel only moderately confident 
that you will be correct, you might rate yourself with a 5 or 6. 
And, if you feel fairly sure that you will not be correct, you 
might rate yourself with a 0 or 1. You may use any number from 
0 to 10 to indicate how confident you are. Remember to be as 
realistic as possible and avoid wishful thinking or under-esti- 
mating to protect yourself. One final note - I will also be 
keeping track of how long it takes you to complete this test. 
There is no time limit, however, and you may take as much time 
as you want. 
(For Skill Group only) Although the judgments required here 
can be very difficult, we have found that many people are highly 
skilled at this task and do consistently better than others. The 
results depend entirely upon your, ability. Do as well as you 
can, and we will see how much skill you have at this. 
(For Chance Group only) Although the judgments required 
here are at a level which makes a correct judgment entirely a 
matter of chance, some people are lucky and make a number of 
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correct choices. Do as well as you can, and we will see how 
lucky you are at this. 
(After Trial 6, for Reward Groups only) Now we would like 
to get an idea of what effect incentive has on your performance. 
In order to gauge the effect of reward on performance, we will 
do the following: If you are successful in making the correct- 
judgment on either of the next two cards, we will give you four 
extra experimental points. This procedure has been approved by 
the chairman of the department as well as your individual in- 
structor. Remember, make the correct judgment and we will give 
you four extra experimental points. 
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The present study is a direct continuation of the work by 
Phares (1965) and hotter and Muiry (1966). Phares studied the 
degree to which introducing a reward in skill and chance 
situations influenced expectancy. Since the skill situation j.s 
a challenge to as competency and a chance situation is not, Phares 
hypothesized that there would be a decrement in expectancy for the 
skill group and no change for the chance group. The hypothesis 
was not confirmed. Instead, Ss in both situations showed a 
decrement in expectancy following the introduction of reward. 
Post hoc., Phares hypothesized that the use of the Stromberg 
Dexterity Test as the experimental task may have prevented Ss 
from perceiving the task as entirely controlled by chance factors. 
Rotter and Mulry used a skill-chance dichotomy with internal 
and external Ss in both situations. They found that internals had 
longer reaction times than externals in the skill situation, and 
that externals had longer reaction times than internals in the 
chance situation. -hey therefore concluded that internals 
place a higher reinforcement value on the skill situations as 
opposed to the chance situation and that externals place higher 
reinforcement value on chance situations as opposed to the skill 
situations. 
The present experimental situation employed a novel task to 
avoid the iherent skill nature of the Stromberg Dexterity Test, 
and used both internal and external Ss in skill, chance, and 
ambiguous situations. Bothe expectancy statements and decision 
time were used as dependent variables. 
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The major predictions concerned with expectancy were: 
1. Introduction of reward following a success 
experience should result in a decrement in expectancies in 
the skill situation and no change in the chance situation 
relative to the nonreward controls. 
2. Following the introduction or reward, internals 
in the skill situation should show a decrement in expectancies 
and externals in the skill situation should show no change. 
Externals in the chance situation should show a decrement in 
expectancies and the internals no change. 
The major predictions concerned with decision time, or 
reinforcement value, were: 
1. Following the introduction of reward, decision 
time should increase more in the skill than chance situation 
to the nonreward controls. 
2. Internals should show an increase in decision 
time following the introduction of reward in the skill 
situation and no change in the chance situation. The opposite 
was held for external Ss. 
Although none of the major predictionS were confirmed, it 
was found that failure to obtain a reward increased the reinforcing 
value of the skill situation over the chance situation and that 
internals react defensively by lowering their expectancies for 
success in both skill'and chance 'situations following failure. 
Externals, on the other hand, appeared to be free of responsibility 
for failure in both situations. 
